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Abstract What explains the recent rise of undesirable populist mobilization in
US politics? In this paper, I examine the hypothesis that the rise of undesir-
able populist politics is related to the increased concentration of power on the
US president. After presenting the main theoretical arguments, I use Coopera-
tive Congressional Election Study (CCES) survey data from the 2008, 2012 and
2016 elections to explore whether perceived power structure can explain the rise
of populism. I find that more concentrated power is indeed linked to clusters of
undesirable populist mobilization. That is, concentrated power is associated with
political mobilization based on constructed cleavages (e.g. identity such as race, re-
ligion, ethnicity, gender, shared history, region, social symbols or language) rather
than structural cleavages (e.g. class, economic goods, education, rights or security
distinctions). The most significant policy implication of the paper is the insight
that efforts to ameliorate populist politics, if accompanied by more concentration
of political power, will be counterproductive.
Keywords Collective Decision-Making · Asymmetric Information · Rational
Choice · Concentration of Power · Populism · American politics · Political efficacy ·
Nationalization of Elections
JEL Classification: D7 and D82 · H7 · H13 · P16
1 Introduction
While populist mobilization has become an area of intense public concern, there is
little consensus on whether populism is a tendency to be expected in the normal
working of market democracies1 or a corruption of it2. Consequently, there is wide
disagreement on what should or can be done about it.
E-mail: mitokojb@pwcs.edu
1 SeePosner (2004); Miguel (2004); Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013); Rickford (2016); Shrivas-
tava and Ivanova (2015); Mishel and Bivens (2011).
2 See Oliver and Rahn (2016); Judis (2016); Jardina and Traugott (2019); Langman and
Lundskow (2012); Weisberg (2015).
2 1 INTRODUCTION
In addition, while scholars have identified many triggers of populist mobiliza-
tion3 the studies have tended to assume, erroneously, that the trigger and the
societal cleavage exploited by the populist movement occur on a straightforward
single-axis framework. In seeking to measure the role of populist mobilization in
shaping voting behavior, these studies have too often glossed over numerous gaps,
paradoxes and contradictions.
Although the unexpected election of Donald Trump provided the main catalyst
for the renewed academic interest in populist mobilization, Trump is the culmi-
nation of a worrying trend that became apparent after the election of President
Barack Obama (Oliver and Rahn, 2016; Sides et al., 2017). Before the current
upsurge, undesirable populist mobilization was often thought to be a tropical dis-
ease plaguing poor sub-Saharan African countries (see for example Easterly and
Levine, 1997). Undesirable populist politics was therefore the preserve of special-
ist political scientists who focused on pathologies of inchoate liberal democracies.
Populist mobilization has retained this stigma as a symptom of “backwardness”
(Di Tella, 1997) requiring a sociological (Deutsch, 1961; Canovan, 1999) rather
than a rational-scientific explanation.
For example, Berlet (2011) relied on social movement theory to argue that
the emergence of the Tea Party movement after the election of President Barack
Obama was the result of “increasing anxieties, fears, and anger in a predominantly
White middle class and working class constituency” who resorted to “the scape-
goating of liberals, people of color, immigrants, and other targets” to promote their
agenda (see also Bradberry and Jacobson, 2015). This framing recurs in other de-
pictions of populism such as the “birther movement” (Jardina and Traugott, 2019)
where misinformation and conspiratorial beliefs are important.
However, by the end of 2011, the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement was
eclipsing the Tea Party movement in media coverage (Shrivastava and Ivanova,
2015; Mishel and Bivens, 2011). If the Tea Party’s “very dark undertones” fueled
by a “rabid anger and aggression toward Obama”(Langman and Lundskow, 2012,
p. 589) provided an imagery of populist threat to liberal democracy, the OWS was
its inverse. Often depicted as a spontaneous grassroots—the loose-knit coalition
of activists was more “moment than movement” (Calhoun, 2013)—challenge to
corporate excesses in a struggle between stakeholders and shareholders (Shrivas-
tava and Ivanova, 2015), the OWS represented the depth of liberal democracy at
work. Along with the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement—the heroic struggle
against racialized police misconduct—the OWS has come to represent the modern
human rights struggle. Its key features, or departure from the old social movement
theory, being its youthfulness, radical militancy, social media prominence, inclu-
siveness, globalization and a populism that repudiates materialism, respectability
and electoral politics (Rickford, 2016; Tillery, 2019).
The divergence in the normative implications of these two contrasting views
on populist mobilization provide the context for the discussion in this paper. My
3 For example, (1) identity crises (Sides et al., 2017; Allen et al., 1989; Mcveigh and Maria-
Elena, 2009); (2) socioeconomic grievances, discontentment and inequality between cultur-
ally defined groups (Dawson, 1994; White, 2007; Cederman et al., 2011; Houle, 2015; Houle
et al., 2019; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013; Mishel and Bivens, 2011; Bobo and Gilliam, 1990);
(3) racial backlash (Scala et al., 2015; Gimpel et al., 2004; Knuckey, 2010; Valentino et al.,
2011; Bradberry and Jacobson, 2015; Weisberg, 2015); and (4) gaps in political efficacy (Oliver
and Rahn, 2016).
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approach to the debate follows the appeal in Langman and Lundskow (2012) that
the main goal of scholarship should be to understand the underlying drivers of
episodic emergence and disappearance of populist movements.
Can power structure explain the episodic emergence and disappearance of pop-
ulist movements? I use CCES survey data from the 2008, 2012 and 2016 elections
to examine this question.
The analysis presented is closely related to Dawson’s (1994) linked fate theory
where information plays the central role in explaining the apparent dominance of
constructed cleavages (i.e. race interests) over structural cleavages (i.e. class in-
terests) in African American political behavior. In Dawson information is defined
as the awareness of actual or perceived intragroup and intergroup differences; the
former increases the salience of race while the latter reduces it. In Dawson, there-
fore, the rationality that unites the identity group is procedural (what works)
rather than optimal (what is best). Dawson, therefore, provides a convenient ra-
tional choice foundation for the hierarchical relationship between structural and
constructed cleavages developed in this paper.
However, unlike Dawson (1994, p. 5, emphasis in the original) for whom “African-
American politics, including political behavior, is different”, I apply the framework
more generally to all socioeconomic and sociopolitical cleavages. Secondly, while
Dawson examines intragroup and intergroup differences at the local community
level, I focus on the national level. Finally, unlike Dawson I focus on the counter-
intuitive finding that salience of race among African Americans has continued even
as intragroup economic and ideological interests have diverged (see also Allen et al.,
1989; Hochschild and Weaver, 2015).
Perhaps White, Laird, and Allen (2014) is closest to the central argument of
this paper when they present the tradeoff between self-interest and group members
common interests as an enforcement problem. The implication in White et al. is
that race is dominant because “racialized social pressure and internalized beliefs
in group solidarity” may be more effective at social monitoring, constraining and
depressing self-interested behavior than structural class-based cleavages. In this
perspective, the function of constructed cleavages is controlling the behavior and
attitudes of members rather than non-members as suggested in prior research (see
White, 2007; Robinson, 2007; Mcveigh and Maria-Elena, 2009).
The paper contributes to existing research in two ways. First, I theorize and
empirically investigate an instrumental, or procedural, link between constructed
cleavages and power structure. To the best of my knowledge, prior literature has
not attempted to empirically link the rise of identity-based populist movements to
changes to the power structure. Secondly, the analysis is among the first to examine
constructed and structural cleavages within a normative dichotomous framework
at the voter level.
The case presented in this paper has methodological limitations. The most
serious being the crude proxy used to measure the perceived power structure.
Consistent with prior research, I use straight-ticket voting (see Abramowitz and
Webster, 2016). Consequently, straight-ticket voting explains the power structure
(explanans) and is also explained by the power structure (explicandum). This
problem is common to empirical analysis of instrumental variables, for example,
between institutional quality and economic performance as noted in (Rodrik, 2007,
p. 185). Despite the limitations, my results can provide suggestive evidence and
tentative conclusions that are helpful for undertaking further research.
4 2 CONSTRUCTED AND STRUCTURAL CLEAVAGES
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and 3 reviews some of
the most relevant literature for our question. Section 4 develops a simple model
that illustrates the relationship between concentration of power and the rise of
populism. Section 5 presents the empirical evidence. The last section concludes
and indicates possibilities for further research.
2 Constructed and Structural Cleavages
Prior scholarship has assumed that a straightforward single-axis framework links
the societal cleavage exploited by the populist movement and its professed goals. In
these studies therefore populism is defined by its (i) distinctive manichean rhetor-
ical style, partisanship, conflictual and antagonistic logic (Mudde and Kaltwasser,
2013); (ii) its collectivist language, conspiratorial thinking, lack of decorum, flaunt-
ing of established rules of engagement (Judis, 2016; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013;
Jardina and Traugott, 2019); (iii) repudiation of “established structures of power
and the dominant ideas and values” (Canovan, 1999); instigation of “large masses
of poorly organized people into action against the privileges of the better-off”
(Di Tella, 1997); (iv) symbolic, or unrealistic, demands (Judis, 2016) often pro-
pelled by anxiety and anger (Langman and Lundskow, 2012; Berlet, 2011) and an
appeal to popular emotions, prejudices and bigotry based on charisma rather than
issues (Di Tella, 1997) alongside a “unique combination of anti-expertise, anti-
elitism, and pronationalist sentiments” among its supporters (Oliver and Rahn,
2016).
However, these narrow definitions do not explain the gap between the pop-
ulist movementâs professed goals—e.g. cutting taxes, dismantling big government
and the welfare state (Bradberry and Jacobson, 2015) and its most salient uni-
fying sentiment—e.g. the racially-based rabid disdain for Obama (Bradberry and
Jacobson, 2015).
Understanding how this gap develops can help to explain the episodic emer-
gence and disappearance of populist movements. I argue that the distinction be-
tween constructed and structural cleavages can help explain the gap between uni-
fying sentiment in the populist movement and its professed goals. The comparison
between constructed cleavages and structural cleavages is shown in table 1.
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Table 1 Constructed cleavages and Structural cleavages.
Constructed1 Structural2
Sticky, substantial inertia (Green and Palmquist,
1994) often life-long (Skarbek, 2014; Houle et al.,
2019).
Less Sticky (Gilley, 2004; Posner, 2004).
Mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, exclu-
sionary identity markers (Mudde and Kaltwasser,
2013; Robinson, 1983); categorical, discrete and
unordered
Continuous, indiscrete, ordered, inclusionary
(Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013);
Use identity markers to construct mental, socio-
psychological or political-psychological facts. Im-
age rather than issues (Tedesco and Dunn, 2019);
myths and conspiracies (Jardina and Traugott,
2019) rather than evidence
Focused on socioeconomic material facts and
issues-based (Tedesco and Dunn, 2019).
Politically instrumental means to an end. Cleavage
(e.g. race) is intrinsic or embodied (i.e. insepara-
ble) from the voter’s physical identity.
End of itself (Gilley, 2004); Cleavage (e.g. income,
party identification) is extrinsic or disembodied
(i.e. separate) from the voter’s physical identity
(Polanyi, 1944, p. 46) but its functional value is
intrinsic to the voting decision.
Costly defection in both resources and time Defections not costly
Hard to conceal or misrepresent Can be dissimulated, concealed or misrepresented
Easy and cheap to identify members accurately. Identifying members accurately is hard and expen-
sive.
1 Examples include race, gender, shibboleths, ethnicity, religion, nationality, language, tattoos, scarifi-
cation and circumcision.
2 Examples include party identification or ideological identification, socioeconomic status.
Constructed cleavages are associated with fixed, or “sticky”, often nonnego-
tiable, embodied identity markers such as race, religion, gender, shared history, re-
gion, social symbols or language. Structural cleavages, by contrast, are less “sticky”
extrinsic, disembodied identity markers such as economic goods, education, rights
or security distinctions.
Polanyi (1944, p. 46) was among the first modern scholars to note a distinction
in value priorities between structural and constructed cleavages. Polanyi associ-
ated constructed cleavages (embodied) with noneconomic motives—such as social
standing, maintenance of social ties and so forth—which then drive the value of
material goods (i.e. disembodied, structural cleavages). For Polanyi, the more im-
portant point was that the tendency toward constructed cleavages was stronger in
the traditional tribal society where individual interest was secondary to community
interest because the society was threatened collectively, not individually.
Since Polanyi, the desire to empirically explain the salience of the societal cleav-
age used in the political mobilization has taken four broad directions: 1) identity-
based explanations, 2) sociological explanations, 3) rational-scientific/economic
explanations, and 4) psychological/emotional explanations.
2.1 Identity-based explanations
The major theme of identity-based explanations has been to show that iden-
tity markers are a constructed (disembodied) phenomena. Sometimes referred
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to as the ideational approach—i.e. a set of ideas—this literature has tended to
strip constructed identity markers of their distinctive physical characteristics. The
ideational approach allowed Posner (2004) to argue that the salience of ethnic-
ity depended on the relative sizes of the cultural groups, proximity and com-
petitiveness of elections and economic inequality. Posner therefore views cultural
differences as socio-psychological or political-psychological ethnic consciousness
constructed to increase political leverage (see also Eifert et al., 2010).
Embodied aspects of our makeup are also subordinated in Houle, Park, and
Kenny (2019, emphasis added) who extended membership in ethnic grouping be-
yond strict genealogical facts to encompass “ethnolinguistic, racial, and ethnoreli-
gious” beliefs in a shared ancestry. Belief systems (rather than facts) is also fun-
damental to the model of black group racial identity and consciousness in Allen,
Dawson, and Brown (1989, p. 421) where the belief system is thought to “help
process, constrain, and bias . . . interpretation of reality and influence social and
political behavior.” For Allen et al. (1989, p. 421) therefore African-American
belief systems connects constructed and structural cleavages because the belief
system is structured by race and influenced by “socioeconomic status, individual
religiosity, and black media.” In Kendi (2019, emphasis added) the racist, and
antiracist, challenge is not about fixed identities (facts) but “what we do about
race” (actions).
In Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013, p. 168) existing grievances explain the salience
and intensity of the dominant identity dimension. Therefore, socioeconomic in-
equality determined the form of populism (inclusive) in Latin American while
nationalistic xenophobia determined the form of populism (exclusive) in post-
material Europe.
2.2 Sociological-based explanations.
The major theme of sociological-based explanations has been the tradeoff between
self-interest and group members’ common interests (White et al., 2014; Allen et al.,
1989; Hochschild and Weaver, 2015). Therefore sociological explanations involve
competition between different value priorities and a dynamic criteria for political
choice: self (often directly economic) verses group (often noneconomic motives
drive the value of material goods).
In sociological explanations, construction of identity markers, identity group-
ings and identity categories involves intense competition and struggle over socially
constructed morality and civil rights (Mcveigh and Maria-Elena, 2009). This fight
over identity categories is a life-long socialization process where meaning is con-
structed and reconstructed with every social interaction or major event. When
Mcveigh and Maria-Elena examined this process within the context of initiatives
proposing to ban same-sex marriage between 2000 and 2008, they found wide varia-
tion across local contexts based on perceptions of threat to traditional gender roles
and family structure.
For Deutsch (1961) the privileged identity dimension in social mobilization is
related to the process of change, or modernization, and the stages of economic
development as countries move from traditional to modern ways of life. Modern-
ization privileges personal identity and interest over cultural or social identity.
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Inglehart (1971, 1990) rejected Deutsch (1961) when he argued that economic af-
fluence has led to a postmaterialistic criteria for political choice which privileges
noneconomic sociocultural factors over economic factors. However, when Brown
and Carmines (1995) reexamined this postmaterialists hypothesis, they found little
support for it. Rather, their findings suggested that “noneconomic, postmaterial
concerns exerted an effect even on those voters who placed their highest priority
on economic security”.
2.3 Rational-scientific/economist explanations.
The major theme of rational-scientific/economist explanations has been the com-
plex nature of social mobilization. For example, the realistic group conflict theory
(RGCT) which developed in response to symbolic racism theory (examined in the
next subsection) sought to explain why specific racist policies persisted despite
the general progress in racial equality and integration (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990).
RGCT focused on important complexities in the data in its “conceptualization
and measurement of racial attitudes”. Therefore, rather than “blatantly stereo-
typical beliefs or hostile orientations” and “subjective reactions to political actors
and events”, racist policies emerged from the perceived threat to the white so-
cial world and the belief among whites that something valuable would be lost in
desegregation.
Houle, Park, and Kenny (2019) argued that the interaction between ethnicity
and economic inequality provides the main mechanism linking ethnic cleavages to
ethnic voting. Therefore, some ethnic groups vote along ethnic lines while others
do not because “ethnicity and socioeconomic inequality reinforce one another”.
Intersection is perhaps strongest in intersectionality theory which argues that
constructed and structural identities might have a combined effect that is greater
than the sum of the parts. Coined by the black feminist scholar KimberlÃ➞
Williams Crenshaw, intersectionality theory was first used to show that the in-
tersectional socioeconomic experience (structural cleavage) of racism and sexism
(constructed cleavages) of black women has been denied redress because racism
and sexism received separate judicial treatment (Carbado et al., 2013; Crenshaw,
1989).
In Scala et al. (2015) the growing political and economic diversity in rural
America is linked to migration. Therefore migration explains the changes in voting
patterns, the content of political debates and the types of public services offered in
new recreational counties which have emerged alongside the old farming counties.
2.4 Psychological/emotional explanations.
Psychological emotions and passions is a central theme of populist mobilization
and political socialization. Populism is associated with massive eruption of popular
emotions, prejudices and bigotry, often from uneducated poor masses, instigated by
charismatic appeals (Di Tella, 1997) and propelled by anxiety and anger (Langman
and Lundskow, 2012; Berlet, 2011), conspiratorial thinking and misinformation
(Jardina and Traugott, 2019) anti-expertise and anti-elitism (Oliver and Rahn,
2016) rather than a sober contemplation of the issues.
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In symbolic racism theory, underlying prejudices and intolerant attitudinal
predisposition are acquired during early childhood socialization rather than from
self-interested behavior (see Bobo, 1983).
Miguel (2004) associated the salience of ethnic divisions with political social-
ization by political leaders who use mass media and the educational system to
inculcate political ideas on citizens. Eifert et al. (2010) investigated the sources of
ethnic identification—relative to occupational and class identities—in Africa and
found that ethnic identities were strengthened by political competition.
Robinson (2007) observed that since discriminatory beliefs, symbols and mean-
ing are constantly shown to be baseless, they need to be continuously reconstructed
(see also Mcveigh and Maria-Elena, 2009). This reconstruction process, within the
context of electoral competition, has been associated with emotive image adver-
tisements and dirty personal campaign appeals, rather than issues (Tedesco and
Dunn, 2019). This focus on image advertising in campaign-negative appeals is
thought to undermine democracy and the ability of voters to make informed,
rational, issue-based voting decisions (Tedesco and Dunn, 2019, p. 937). For ex-
ample, Tesler (2012) has argued that public opinions on health care reform became
racially polarized when President Obama became the face of the policy.
However, political socialization has also been depicted positively. The function
of constructed cleavages has been associated with the need to build and ensure
loyalty and solidarity in the behavior and attitudes of members (see White, 2007;
Robinson, 2007; Mcveigh and Maria-Elena, 2009). For example, it can ameliorate
ethnic divisions and thereby increase fund-raising for local public goods (Miguel,
2004).
3 US political power structure
The major recent trend in US political power structure has been the move to-
ward nationalization of elections (Sievert and Mckee, 2018; Bartels, 2000). That
is, the process where presidential and national politics exert greater influence over
down-ballot contest (Jacobson, 2015). While the literature has suggested several
explanations for how this tightening of the linkage between the White House and
low-level electoral contests impacts the salience of the various societal cleavages in
electoral competition, empirical support for these explanations has been ambigu-
ous.
In particular, the explanations have not adequately addressed the many para-
doxes and contradictions in observed political behavior. For example, why did so
many white women, in voting for Trump, choose “a party that hates women as
a matter of public policy” (Cooper, 2018, p. 172)? The explanations have not
adequately addressed the paradox of why nationalization of elections is occur-
ring at the same time that voters express great opposition and resentment to
“Washington” and “big government” (Judis, 2016, p. 43). For Judis, opposition to
Washington occurs because working-class and middle-class voters oppose higher
taxes to support programs that they believe do not primarily benefit them but
rather provide unearned benefits to minorities and the poor.
Sievert and Mckee (2018) associated the nationalization of elections with the
move “toward a more responsible party system.” However, responsible party sys-
tem is contradicted by the election of Donald Trump who is the first U.S. president
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to hold neither elected political office nor to serve in the military or the government
before coming to office (Tedesco and Dunn, 2019).
While traditional models can explain why the national unified commitment
of African American voters to the Democratic Party began with the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Right Act (White et al., 2014), the models fail to
explain why this national commitment has endured despite the growing political
conservatism and socioeconomic divergence in the black community (Allen et al.,
1989; Hochschild and Weaver, 2015).
Abramowitz and Webster (2016) have argued that negative partisanship is the
driving force in nationalization and partisan voting. That is, as partisan identities
become more closely aligned with social, cultural and ideological divisions, party
supporters develop negative feelings about the opposing party and its candidates.
However, there is good reason to believe that the country is in fact less socially,
culturally and ideologically divided (see for example Mcveigh and Maria-Elena,
2009, for opinions on same-sex marriage).
4 Simple model of populist mobilization
The simple theoretical model of populism developed in this paper contains two
decision stages. The first is based on concentration of power. The second is based
on the importance of the electoral contest.
Concentrated power is associated with (i) information asymmetry (see Weiss,
2016; Bookman, 2017; Dawson, 1994; Carlson, 2019) (ii) distrust (Webster, 2018;
Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, and Hutchings, 2011; Anderson,
2010); and (iii) enforcement problems (White, 2007; Webster, 2018) between po-
litical leaders in government and the voters.
Therefore, when power is concentrated, political decisions appear arbitrary,
discretionary and capricious and only general enforcement of political bargains is
possible. In such situations, internal efficacy [(see Clarke and Acock, 1989; Kuk-
linski, 1978; Oliver and Rahn, 2016) for discussion of the two kinds of political
efficacy] is salient: voters must have (or develop) the requisite collective skills and
collective resources to influence the political system.
For these voters, the societal cleavage exploited/used for political mobilization
is derived, or constructed (e.g. identity such as race, religion, ethnicity, gender,
shared history, region, social symbols or language) and indirectly linked to pro-
fessed goals. Therefore a gap develops between unifying sentiment and professed
goals, this is the defining characteristic of undesirable populist mobilization.
Constructed cleavages become salient because membership is “sticky” and
cheap to identify and therefore less susceptible to opportunistic behavior. Con-
structed cleavages seek to secure and ensure loyalty and solidarity within the
political coalition. That is, social monitoring to control coalition members, and
prevent the coalition from disintegrating, is an important intermediary step in the
pursuit collective interests.
When power is dispersed, political decisions are non-discretionary, information
is accessible, and enforcement of specific political bargains is possible. Dispersed
power is associated with external political efficacy since voters have the perception
that government institutions are responsive to them. For these voters, the soci-
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etal cleavage used for political mobilization is structural ( e.g. income, ideology,
occupation) and directly linked to professed goals.
Secondly, importance of the electoral contest matters in populist mobilization.
Weber and Franklin (2018) argued that the criteria for political choice may be dif-
fer between important national executive office and less important local, regional,
or supranational contests. For Weber and Franklin, the former is associated with
structure—“coordinated behavior emerging from objective aspects of party pref-
erence”—while the latter with entropy—“idiosyncratic voting behavior guided by
subjective evaluations”.
This theoretical model can provide a rational choice foundation (see Dawson,
1994), that also incorporates insights from information and institutional economics
(Stiglitz, 2002), to the problem of populism. This approach departs from predomi-
nant models where sociological explanations, based on an optimal decisions criteria
(what is best)—rather than procedural decisions criteria (what works)—are gen-
erally used.
The model has three advantages. First, it can help explain the numerous con-
tradictions in the choice of societal cleavage used in political mobilization. Sec-
ondly, allows normative lessons to be drawn from the analysis. Third, it provides
a tentative remedy to the problem of undesirable populism.
To summarize:
H1: Voters have a dynamic criteria for political choice. The criteria is driven by
power structure and determines the societal cleavage used in political mobilization;
H2: Empirically, the dynamic criteria presents as stable clusters of structural and
constructed cleavages in voter behavior;
H3. Since structural cleavages are best (optimal), constructed cleavages should
only present in special situations where structural cleavages do not work;
H4. The problem of populism is one of these special situations.
5 Data and Methods
To see what populist mobilization looks like to voters, I relied on CCES data
from the 2008, 2012 and 2016 US elections (Ansolabehere, 2006). CCES seeks to
provide sufficiently large national stratified samples to measure and study, with
a reasonable degree of precision, the American voters preferences and how those
preferences are reflected in voter choices during elections. CCES employs com-
putational algorithms to allow for demographically representative samples to be
drawn within each state and congressional district.
Before turning to the empirical analysis, it is important to review the research
problem in light of available data. I want to use the available data to explain
the recent rise of populist mobilization. I want to test the hypothesis that power
structure matters. Finally, I want to find out whether normative lessons can be
drawn from this explanation.
The simple model of populism suggested that empirical evidence can be ob-
tained by looking for stable clusters of voting behavior. Voting behavior between
and within clusters can help support the hypothesis that power structure is the
decisive factor.
Similar to prior investigation of political efficacy (Clarke and Acock, 1989;
Kuklinski, 1978; Oliver and Rahn, 2016) and political psychology (Blankenship
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et al., 2018), I use factor analysis to investigate the relationship between power
structure and the choice of political cleavage. Factor analysis is generally used
to measure a single latent variable through the relationships it causes in a set of
categorical variables. Factor analysis is based on the idea that multiple items may
be combined to produce clusters which are both stable and predictive of voting
behavior in a way that single items cannot (Blankenship et al., 2018).
I test the hypothesis that this single latent variable is the perceived power
structure. This variable is measured by frequency of votes that each individual
voter cast for the two main political parties in presidential or sub-presidential
contests (see Abramowitz and Webster, 2016). The available categorical variables
from the CCES data include race (”White”, ”Black”, ”Mixed”, ”Hispanic”), Ed-
ucation ( ”No HS”, ”HS”, ”college”, ”Post-grad”), Ideology (10 point scale from
”very liberal” to ”very Conservative”), family income (17 different ranges, scaled
by ideology in the factor analysis) and Party ID (”GOP”,”DEM”, ”INDP”).
Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of votes for democratic and republi-
can party candidates grouped by structural (i.e party identification, ideology and
attitudes on abortion) and constructed (i.e. race) cleavages.
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Fig. 1 Plot of income, ideology, party ID and race, Source: CCES 2008, 2012, 2016.
The data confirms the partisan voting and nationalization of election in previ-
ous research (see Sievert and Mckee, 2018) and the prominence of identity (racial)
voting among all racial groups.
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6 Results and Conclusion
The results of the maximum-likelihood factor analysis are shown in figure 2. The
factor analysis (using factanal function from the psych package of the R program-
ming language and software environment) extracted two factors. The two factors
were associated with constructed and structural cleavages as discussed below1.
Fig. 2 Factor Loadings of Concentration of Power and Voting Behavior, Source: CCES 2008,
2012, 2016.
The results of factor analysis can be analyzed by comparing the factor loading
between structural and constructed cleavages (left and right columns) and then
between split-ticket voters and straight-ticket voters (top and bottom rows). The
loadings are correlations with the voter characteristics. We are looking for high
bars (red) and only reported value above 0.1. This is a subjective exercise, however.
Comparing structural (left column) to constructed (right column) cleavages,
the most salient voter characteristics in structural bar charts (left side) are educa-
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tion and family income while the most salient voter characteristics in constructed
bar charts (right side) are ideology and abortion. The existence of these stable clus-
ters is consistent with the hypothesis that different value priorities and decision
criteria are used by different types of voters.
Comparing straight-ticket voting with split-ticket voting (top row with bottom
row) shows that education and family income are important for split-ticket voters
in the structural cleavages dimension (left column). For constructed cleavages di-
mension (right column), race, abortion and ideology are slightly more important
for straight-ticket voters while family income and education are more important
for split-ticket voters.
In conclusion, the results us allow to tentatively accept the hypothesis that
undesirable populist voting behavior is procedural and derived (what works) rather
than optimal and direct (what is best).
The analysis was based on a relatively simple model. The model assumed a
heuristic voting behavior whereby the value criteria for political decisions shifted
based on political efficacy. In environments with high political efficacy, voters pur-
sued their individual self interest directly while in environments of low political
efficacy, voters first sought to increase their efficacy by coordinated collective ac-
tion. Self-interested voting behavior favored structural cleavages while collective
behavior favored constructed cleavages. Therefore, the analysis confirmed that the
reemergence of populism is rooted in perceived changes to the American political
power structure.
Oliver and Rahn (2016) attributed this power structure to American political
party nomination process and the electoral collage system where minorities be-
longing to important swing states exert outsized pressure on the political system.
This viewpoint is supporter by Sides et al. (2017) who observed that Trump ac-
tually lost the popular vote by 2.1 points but won the presidency due mostly to
white voters in the Obama coalition with anti-immigrant attitudes who defected
to Trump in 2016.
The results of the study provide suggestions for political institutions in other
countries where identity politics are an enduring problem. While the findings of
this study show an interesting relationship between powers structure and populism,
further research is needed.
Notes
1I performed the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) factor adequacy tests to ensure that partial
correlations close enough to zero in at least one latent factor. h2 and u2 are the communality
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